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Abstract
This paper sets forth that governance brokerage can be regarded as a
natural outgrowth of the actual practice of Corporate Governance. To
lay the foundations of our subject, firstly we delve into the dual nature of
any transaction. Then we move on to define what the expression
“governance broker” means, underlining five professional arrangements
from which governance intermediation can be achieved. Next, it is shown
how trade splits up economic agents’ information sets, giving rise to the
brokerage of asymmetric information. Afterwards, we account for the
ways a governance broker meets his goals in dyadic and polyadic
relationships, bringing forward distinctive courses of action: clinical
assistance, consultancy to foster growth and value, governance
engineering, tutoring on global standards of governance, mediation in
conflicts of interests, even international intermediation.
JEL: G30, G34, G20
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INTRODUCTION
Whenever any intermediary fulfills his professional tasks, he also carries out
the role of a broker of asymmetric information
1. In this paper, we argue
that governance practice in everyday life gives rise to governance
brokers
2. To accomplish our objectives, we are going to develop the
following topics:
Section 1 deals with information sets, moving on next to the dual nature of
any transaction.  In section 2, it will be introduced what a governance
broker stands for, pointing to some real players in such brokerage field.
It is for section 3 firstly to show how the governance brokerage actually
does split up information sets and, secondly, to point up distinctive
environments in which economic agents and brokers trade upon
asymmetric information.
Last of all, section 4 addresses the role of a governance broker focusing
on dyadic and tryadic relationships through which he binds himself with
other economic agents who ask for his professional assistance.
1.  INFORMATION SETS
Either by trading straight with another party, or by means of a third agent
who acts on his behalf as an intermediary, any political or economic
actor
3 makes up his mind on the basis of available information
4, which
springs from his own stock or, still further, from the one supplied by his
counterpart or intermediary. In this context, trading refers to a wide range
of events or processes which comprises the buying and selling either of
merchandises or services, intermediating, contracting, keeping long or
short future positions in the commodities, financial or labor markets,
                                               
1 Apreda (2001) is an introduction to this issue, and the place where it was coined the
expression “the brokerage of asymmetric information”.
2 This paper contributes to the research line on the field of governance into which I have
been engaged the last eight years. I presented a prior draft with the underlying
mathematical foundations, at the Eastern Finance Association 2006 Annual Meeting,
held in Philadelphia. A stronger rendering of our research work has been our recently
published book “Differential Rates, Residual Information Sets, and Transactional
Algebras”, Nova Publishers, New York, 2006a.
3 It goes without saying that “economic or political actor (or agent)” stands for both
individuals and organizations.
4 As from now, although most of what can be predicated upon information sets is
attached either to political or economic actors, we restrain ourselves to the latter in the
remainder of this paper.3
consulting, negotiating a peace agreement, even discussing in
Parliament for a Bill to be passed.
Nevertheless, and narrowing down the examples to meet this paper’s
objectives, we are particularly concerned with those exchanges in which
organizations become involved when reshaping their governance
structures. It does not seem farfetched to regard most of what takes place
in those environments as stemming from the economic units’ underlying
information sets.
Definition 1 Information Sets
By an Information Set of certain economic actor “ e “ at date “ t “ is
meant all the available information he gets access up to that date.
We denote such a set as
W W( t ; e )
and the fact that past information up to that date is also stored in the
current information set can be translated by the nesting condition:
W W( t – j  ; e )    Í Í    W W( t ; e )    ;      j : 1, 2, 3, ......
While this is a widely known definition, some qualifications are worth
noticing for the sake not only of semantics but rigor, as well.
a) We said that the agent stores only attainable information
to him. In other words, he reaches his decision, in most cases, with
only a fraction of the whole information to which he could get
access otherwise.
b) Whereas information sets can be regarded as plausible
databanks for any agent, they also convey the idea of toolkits for
decision-making. In fact, they include mathematical models and
heuristic procedures, points of view and beliefs, market trends,
biases, error analysis and learning skills. Also past experiences,
technological resources, and professional credentials, just to give
some particular examples of what is a highly pervasive notion.
c) Although in this paper we are going to handle them as
synonyms, some fields of research treat information sets and
knowledge sets like being different. The latter usually comprises not
only current contents of information sets, but also any learning each
economic agent had been mastering with such information in the4
span of time leading to that date. To avoid ambiguity, some
scholars have started to substitute knowledge spaces for the
expression knowledge sets
5.
Turning now to the prominent actors who swap information among them,
we have to be aware that trading in markets involves at least four parties
6:
· buyers, who demand goods and services;
· sellers, who supply goods and services;
· intermediaries, who are experts at handling transactional
networks to provide buyers and sellers with pricing and
contractual linkages, cost reduction, conveniences, and
innovative delivery services;
· regulators, who set up conditions and procedures upon which
intermediaries, buyers and sellers can ultimately round off their
transactions.
What does it foster the role of intermediaries? The answer lies on the
different endowments of imperfect information which economic agents
gain access to. Nevertheless, intermediaries also perform manifold related
tasks:
 i. they take advantage of their investment in technology as well as
human capital to enhance their line of business and own
information sets;
 ii. they willingly bring about opportunities for making buyers and
sellers reveal some of their private information;
 iii. they supply their own private information as a worthy
convenience devised for both buyers and sellers’ markets at the
same time.
Whenever any intermediary fulfils these professional services, he becomes
a broker of asymmetric information.
                                               
5 Doignon and Falmagne (1999) offer an appealing treatment of knowledge spaces.
6 This has been a long-standing feature in commodities exchanges and capital markets
for centuries. The latter, at least with their nowadays properties, were already established
by 1850, in spite of wide gaps with our current information technology, financial
engineering and regulatory frameworks. However, they are much older institutions and
Meier Kohn (1999) gives a surprising account of capital markets prior to 1600.5
Therefore, as we approach real world transactions, either transient or
permanent ones, information sets not only keep records about things to
be traded, but also about how trade is to be performed, inclusive of the
agents’ needs and those expectations closely connected with the whole
process.  It is from this viewpoint that the notion of duality deserves to be
introduced.
Definition 2 The dual nature of transactions
While exchanging goods and services among them, buyers, sellers, and
intermediaries jointly engage in a twofold process we are going to call the
dual nature of a transaction:
· on the one hand, there is an actual trade that involves
merchandises, services, securities, or derivatives contracts
grounded on other goods or securities;
· on the other, there is a virtual bargaining of smaller information
subsets included in the actors’ information sets so that they go
through a learning course of action that bind them within the
boundaries of their common knowledge.
Three remarks must be noticed in connection with our definition:
a) Although it is usually said that in a frictionless market any agent
gets access to all available information at no cost and no delay
whatsoever, such statement has come to be regarded in the field
of Financial Economics a rather misplaced and preposterous one,
to say the least. In fact, transaction costs (inclusive of taxes,
financial and information costs, market microstructure costs, trading
costs), credit risk, reputation, financial distress, bankruptcy and
corruption, agency problems and information asymmetries are
utterly ruled out in perfect markets.
b) Even worse, such an ideal world does not take intermediaries
into account. On the whole, neoclassical Economics cast aside the
whole issue of information sets and intermediation like a given
notion in the dark, oblivious of any costly and non-shared
information
7.
                                               
7 More background on this subject in Apreda (2006a). Spulber (1999) gives an updated
rendering on the role of intermediaries from a market microstructure viewpoint, while
Miller (2003) provides a nurturing discussion of asymmetric information and agency
downsides in modern organizations.6
c) In contradistinction, the environment assumed in this paper is,
overwhelmingly, one of imperfect and asymmetric markets
8,
embedded in institutional systems of constraints, where
intermediaries become key players, and opportunistic behavior is a
fact of life.
2. GOVERNANCE BROKERS
Let us start this section with a definition
9.
Definition 3   Governance Broker
An organization performs as a Governance Broker
GB
if it supplies other organizations with
· technical advice, guidelines and expertise on governance issues;
· clinical support and mediation on conflicts of interests;
· design of transitional or new governance structures.
A governance broker, who will be henceforth referred to as GB, could be
a single individual (an expert in the field, for instance), or an organization
that runs through a scale of increasing complexity (from a well-established
law firm to global institutions like the United Nations.)
Briefly stated, a governance broker performs as a consultant, mediator
and intermediary of information in the field of governance, to the extent
of providing even a clinical approach to help its customers
10. Sometimes it
will accomplish the role of a service seller, while in other settings, it will
mediate between buyers and sellers of governance structures
11.
                                               
8 On this regard, Scitovsky’s paper (1990) becomes an essential reading.
9 The wide-ranging semantics appertaining to the expression “governance” is studied in
Apreda (2003, 2006b).
10 An insightful approach to the clinical viewpoint for organizations can be found in
Pranger (1965).
11 In the former environment, we will see the governance broker selling governance
structures, and their design, to one or more buyers. In the latter, we can think the
governance broker is a regulator, while the customers are the companies that must
follow some guidelines about their own governance, as when the Securities and
Exchange Commission prescribes what is the meaning to be attached to the expression
“independent director”.7
The specifics of governance intermediation may be achieved by a wide
variety of likely arrangements among which we are going to underline
some conspicuous examples only (Exhibit 1 intends to be helpful for the
ensuing development).
Exhibit 1 The manifold roles of a governance broker
a) The GB as a consultant
For the sake of illustration, let us point to a single private organization,
frequently small or medium-sized and locally based, either any law firm or











· consultancy and advice
· clinical support and mediation in
conflicts of interest
· intermediary of comparative information
of organizations and countries
· designer of transitional as well as new
governance structures8
compliance with regulations about Corporate Governance. Enforceable
provisions in the Sarbanes-Oxley Act stand as a case in point.
Two late developments also seem worth noticing:
￿  professional enterprises that have started to recruit and train
prospective independent Directors to be appointed in
corporate Boards;
￿  experts in the design of compensation and incentives packages
for corporate senior executives and Directors.
b) Big national organizations
Let us give heed now to those institutions that help their members with
guidelines and advisory services, attempting to draw up new governance
environments in compliance with mainstream standards. Such is the case
of the American Bar Association, as well as Institutes of Corporate
Executives or Business Chambers spread over the world. It goes without
saying that we should include Stock Exchanges when they produce
referential frames for listed companies so as to sharpen up their
governance and good practices.
On the side of regulators, we can choose Securities Exchange
Commissions and central banks, which enforce and interpret laws, setting
up precepts on transparency, good practices, accountability, auditing
practices, money laundering, transfer prices, even transactions with
related parties.
c) GBs in global financial markets
Since the 70s, institutional investors (for instance, insurance companies,
pension funds, mutual funds, fiduciary investment funds) have been
thriving in the financial markets to the extent of becoming big players and
powerful stakeholders.  As such, they attempt to change established
governance styles, as well as to set up new rules of the game
12.
Furthermore, and for the last decade, governance styles around the world
have come under criticism and scrutiny not only on the grounds of global
demands for higher standards of information disclosure and streamlined
valuation procedures, but also in the aftermath of corporate scandals.
                                               
12 Background on governance styles and political constraints are provided by Mark Roe
(2003).9
It should not come as a surprise, therefore, that institutional investors have
started to embed manifold covenants in issuance contracts of bonds,
shares, or financial hybrids. Indeed, covenants constrain companies from
abusing power, while holding them accountable for any breach of
contract.
d) International Institutions as GBs
The most conspicuous intermediaries as regards governance on a global
setting are international institutions.
· On a regional basis, there are institutions (as well agencies that
manage international regimes) that have been helping nations
improve their governance either in the public or in the private
domain. The Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) stands as a
good example, offering expertise and resources to set up structural
reforms in the governance of Latin American countries through
direct assistance to their Central Banks, ministries of Economy or
Security Exchange Commissions.
· For the last three decades, the United Nations, the OECD, the World
Bank, the International Monetary Fund, all of them have been
involved with governance affairs. They meet their goals by
academic production from their governance centers of study, also
through seminars and roundtables usually held in different countries.
They seek to establish global standards to be followed by countries
and corporations alike among which we can point up the building
of governance indexes to measure performance and good
practices.
· Within a narrower professional field, although one of lasting
relevance, we must highlight the work undergone through the Basle
headquarters of the Bank for International Settlements (BIS). With
praiseworthy pace and proficiency, the BIS has been bringing forth
arrangements to be followed by central banks around the world.
These institutions, in turn, behave like conveyor belts to the banks
under their control. Among the issues that the BIS have been
addressing for the last decade we point to those related with
transparency, compliance risk, and procedures to enhance banks’
governance
13.
                                               
13 We refer the reader to BIS’ papers (2001, 2002, 2003, 2005).10
e) Governance Gatekeepers
Last, but not least, we must include GBs of another cast, which were kept
apart from the lot listed above. We refer to academic or technical
alternatives provided by universities, research centers, groups of interest
and non-governmental associations, learned journals, and analysts in the
business, economic and political markets. Collectively, they all belong to
what we know as gatekeepers. They streamline common knowledge,
spreading out innovations and criticisms, disclosing public findings and
theoretical outcomes, even bringing forth misdeeds and deviant
behavior.
3. HOW GOVERNANCE BROKERAGE SPLITS UP
INFORMATION SETS
Let us assume two organizations k and s, and a governance broker GB.
We intend to delve into the trade and to the extent that asymmetric
information pervades their relationship and brings about a full partition of
their information sets (see Exhibit 2)
14.
For instance, W W(t ; k) can be explained by four components:
W W( t ; k )  =  [W W(t;k)  Ç Ç  W W
C(t;s) Ç Ç  W W
C(t;GB)]  È È  [W W(t;k)  Ç Ç  W W(t;s) Ç Ç  W W
C(t;GB)]  È È
È È [W W(t;k)  Ç Ç  W W
C(t;s) Ç Ç  W W(t;GB)] È È [W W(t;k)  Ç Ç  W W(t;s) Ç Ç  W W(t;GB)]
which are labeled, namely, by numbers 6, 2, 3, 1, in the above referred
exhibit.
As for W W(t ; k), it’s worth noticing that is a dated set relentlessly in progress.
Furthermore, the overlapping of the three information sets becomes the
cornerstone of their partition into seven mutually exclusive and exhaustive
subsets 
15.  We are going to characterize some environments in which the
three players intend to reach variegated, albeit distinctive, transactions.
Environment 1
Pooling Information Sets
                                               
14 This method takes advantage of what could be denoted as the geometric topology of
information sets, an approach broadly developed in Apreda (2000, 2004 and 2006a).
15 We had laid down the foundations of this statement elsewhere (Apreda, 2005).11
When two organizations k and s trade with the GB, both of them may wish
to buy (or sell) him germane governance information or structures
16.
Exhibit 2 Partitioning information sets, or how governance
 brokers  bargain for asymmetric information
                                               
16 An example in which the governance broker purchases a service from a seller would
take place when the former contracts with the latter (for instance, a research center in




 W W(t;k)  Ç Ç  W W
C(t;s) Ç Ç  W W
C(t;GB)
W W(t;s)
                   2
5
W W(t;k)Ç ÇW W(t;s)Ç ÇW W
C(t;GB)
                                    W W
C(t;k)Ç ÇW W(t;s)Ç ÇW W
C(t;GB)
                      3
1
 W W(t;k) Ç Ç W W
C(t;s) Ç Ç W W(t;GB)
                                                 W W(t;k) Ç Ç W W(t;s) Ç Ç W W(t;GB)
4
                                                            W W
C(t;k)  Ç Ç  W W(t;s) Ç Ç  W W(t;GB)
    W W
C(t;k)  Ç Ç  W W
C(t;s) Ç Ç  W W(t;GB)
                                                                          W W(t;GB)
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Anyway, for the trade to be effective, all participants carry on their
purposes by starting from the common ground information set that it will
be named subset 1 in Exhibit 2 and comes defined as
W W( t ; k )  Ç Ç  W W( t ; s )  Ç Ç  W W( t ; GB )
By the same token, when a single economic actor (or organization) k
trades with an intermediary GB, they fractionally pool their information
sets, to the extent of sharing information so as to round off the exchange.
That is to say, they will deal with their common knowledge set:
W W( t ; k )   Ç Ç   W W( t ; GB )
which follows from adding sets 3 and 1.
If we catch a glimpse to Exhibit 2, we will realize that pooling doesn’t
necessarily mean relinquishing all the private information endowment
each economic actor is entitled to. Quite the opposite, since private
information becomes the subject matter on which main actors bargain
for.
Environment 2
Private knowledge on the side of both agents
Next, let us now suppose that both agents share some sort of information
that is not easily accessible to an intermediary like the United Nations or
the World Bank. This could be the case when two countries or
corporations are conversant about certain constraints or paths of action
to which the GB is not able to handle for the time being.  Furthermore, let
us imagine that both traders (perhaps two crony-capitalist countries or
corporations) are willing to cheat the dealer and bring him into a loss of
reputation.
Where is such information to be located? It is embedded in subset 2:
W W( t ; k )   Ç Ç  W W
 ( t ; s )  Ç Ç  W W
 C ( t ; GB )
More precisely, we should write
17
                                               
17 For a mathematically trained reader, all information sets, at a certain date t, must be
thought included in the set of all the potential information to which any agent could get
access to, albeit they reach only a fraction of it on regard of constraints, costs, or
bounded rationality. Such enveloping information set is the usually called Universe in
mathematical treatments, which we are going to call the Maximal Information Set
W W( t ; maximal )13
W W( t ; k )   Ç Ç  W W
 ( t ; s )  Ç Ç  W W
 C ( t ;GB )   =
=  { x Î Î W W( t ; s ) and x Î Î W W( t ; k )  and  x Ï Ï W W( t ; GB) }
Environment 3
Private knowledge on the side of the GB
By the same token, let us rephrase the former environment so as to make
the GB owner of some private information that provide him with a cutting
edge over those agents that come to him asking for professional
assistance.
It is for information subset 7 to grant the GB with such an advantage point,
and comes defined as
W W
C ( t ; k )  Ç Ç  W W
C ( t ; s )  Ç Ç  W W( t ; GB )
If we looked for an example to illustrate this environment, it would be
enough to think about the Securities Exchange Commission acting as GB
and discussing with listed companies on impending changes in the
regulatory framework pertaining governance issues.
Environment 4
Exclusive private information
This is the usual setting where most customary adverse selection problems
arise. Let us assume that
W W
 ( t ; k )
is the information set of a state-owned corporation which moves towards
a public offering in the capital market of bonds or shares about to be
                                                                                                                                           
The following statements hold true [further details in Apreda (2001, 2006a)]:
a) for every agent k, at date t,
W W( t ; k )   Í Í   W W( t ; maximal )
b)  W W( t ; k )   Ç Ç  W W
 ( t ; s )  Ç Ç  W W
 C ( t ;GB )   =
=   { x Î Î W W( t ; maximal )  :   x Î Î W W( t ; s ) and x Î Î W W( t ; k )  and  x Ï Ï W W( t ; GB ) }14
issued
18. A plausible GB could be either the Stock Exchange, or the
Security Exchange Commission,
W W
 ( t ; GB )
while
W W
 ( t ; s )
stands for an investment bank (or any market-maker for that matter)
acting on behalf of its portfolio of standing customers and ready to place
purchasing orders on behalf of them. For the company, opportunistic
behavior may be fostered from subset 6:
W W( t ; k )   Ç Ç  W W
C ( t ; s )  Ç Ç  W W
C ( t ; GB )
The investment bank benefits from private information and financial
secrecy when dealing on behalf of his customers, hence resorting to
information subset 5:
W W
C ( t ; k )  Ç Ç  W W( t ; s )  Ç Ç W W
C ( t ; GB )
In actual practice, an investment bank fulfils fiduciary a fiduciary role on
behalf of its customers. Basically, this comes down to duties of loyalty,
care, and information
19. When the bank handles numberless purchasing or
selling orders for customers, it is expected that its behavior be guided by
the business judgement rule
20.
Briefly stated, any information set holds a subset that is privy to each
actor. In a sense, both agents k and s hoard some information under
wraps, albeit a fraction of it may be bargained for with the governance
broker.
It goes without saying that the intermediary also profits from his private
knowledge, as we saw in environment 3 that led to subset 7.
Environment 5 
An agent shares information with the GB but not with the other agent
                                               
18 The process entails looking for investors in the private sector, which could involve deep
changes required by the regulatory governance (for example, to comply with public
offers requirements) and also in the governance of the issuer itself so as to improve the
chances to be successful in the capital markets.
19 Following the Court of Delaware tradition, some authors would rather highlight care, loyalty and
good faith. A remarkable contribution to this debatable issue can be found in Bainbridge (2003).
20 Easterbrook and Fischel (1996) is the standard reference on this subject matter.15
This habitat comes to be an oft-repeated setting, as far as bilateral
negotiations are in progress. The GB can improve his relationship with
agent k because both of them would be willing to share information not
accessible to agent s by means of
W W( t ; k )   Ç Ç  W W
C ( t ; s )  Ç Ç  W W( t ; GB )
which leads to subset 3 that could be regarded as information production
on behalf of agent k, but which comes at a cost for agent s.
From the side of the GB, he can improve his connection with agent s
because both of them may share information not easily accessible for
agent k, as depicted in subset 4:
W W
C ( t ; k )  Ç Ç  W W( t ; s )  Ç Ç  W W( t ; GB )
4. HOW GOVERNANCE BROKERS CARRY OUT
THEIR BROKERAGE OF ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION
It was for section 3 to lay the groundwork that will allow us to expand on
how the governance broker ultimately engages in the trading of
asymmetric information by means of negotiations, good will and
agreements.
In point of fact, asymmetric information (portrayed in Exhibit 2) does not
prevent agent k, for instance, from reaching an agreement by trading
upon his information set
W W( t ; k )
with his counterparts, supplying (or selling) them a fraction of his private
information that he was keeping hidden up to that date in area 6:
W W
 ( t ; k )  Ç Ç  W W
C( t ; s )  Ç Ç  W W
C( t ; GB )
For the sake of illustration, let us move on to a sequence consisting of two
different and plausible environments:
· In the first one, the GB deals with a distinctive economic actor only
(a dyadic relationship);
· whereas, in the second, the GB trades with at least two economic
actors (a polyadic relationship).16
From each environment we are going to elicit two distinguishing features:
 i. Situations in which the GB performs its role professionally.
 ii. The ongoing correlation between tasks and information sets.
4.1 A DYADIC RELATIONSHIP
In this kind of setting, we have two players: the GB and a business
organization that will be denoted as
O k
Why should this dyadic relationship take place eventually? There are
professional reasons for the broker to take upon himself at least four tasks,
namely clinical assistance, consultancy to foster growth and value,
governance engineering, and tutoring global standards of governance
(see Exhibit 3 to follow the text).
a) Clinical assistance
Here we frame a picture in which organization Ok faces an impending
crisis and it approaches the GB so as to overhaul, enhance or, directly, to
change its governance so as to overcome the crisis.
A widespread example is provided when certain corporation, after a
takeover, starts to suffer drainage of customers, suppliers and investors
alike. This is the setting in which the company contracts with a GB for fixing
its ailing structure, request a diagnosis and buy a treatment to sharpen up
its governance. In other words, the company bids for clinical assistance.
b) Consultancy to foster growth and value
In this case, albeit organization Ok is not going through any crisis, it is a
thriving organization with growth opportunities, while hindered by a failing
governance.  For instance, let us think in a regional family company that
attempts to play on the national market. Here, the GB will perform as a
consultant whose role consists in triggering off the conditions under which
growth and value may become sustainable.17
Exhibit 3 Professional tasks for the governance
broker in a  dyadic relationship
c) Governance engineering
Let us imagine that Ok is a new state-owned enterprise, an interstate
agency, or a partnership that links the government with the private sector
to undertake some new venture. In this setting, which actually pertains to
Public Governance, the GB acts on as an engineer who provides the
whole architecture, and designs a construct of covenants to prevent
deviant behavior in the new enterprise
21.
d) Tutoring global standards of governance
Now let us envision listed domestic companies in the stock exchange of a
developing country calling for help and tutorial from an international
institution (like the World Bank or the United Nations), so that the latter
could design new governance structures, and foster their capital markets.
                                               
21 Our forthcoming book on Public Governance will deal with all these issues: Public
Governance, a Blueprint for Political Action and Better Government, by Rodolfo Apreda,









· CONSULTANCY TO FOSTER GROWTH AND VALUE
· GOVERNANCE ENGINEERING
· TUTORING GLOBAL STANDARDS OF GOVERNANCE18
Nowadays, and we would say relentlessly, global markets are requiring
from companies to follow standards of governance and good practices,
while credit-rating firms have started to factor governance risk into their
ratings.
DEALING WITH ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION
How could we analyze this dyadic relationship when we mirror it from the
underlying information sets?
Firstly, the GB enters the relationship with its counterpart Ok to profit from
common information. This is depicted in the overlapping
W W( t; Ok ) Ç Ç W W( t; GB )
of both information sets.
Secondly, either the organization Ok or the GB are willing to partake
private information. In Exhibit 4 (dotted line), we can see that a
consequential outcome of their relationship amounts to an enlargement
of the starting common knowledge to areas 4 and 5. This asserts that the
GB allows Ok to embody new information (area 5) to change its
governance, but this was feasible only because the organization also
provides the GB with key information that it was keeping under wraps in
area 4.
4.2 A POLYADIC RELATIONSHIP
The discussion will be constrained to a tryadic relationship, although the
extension towards more than three players comes after the same line of
argument (see Exhibit 5 to follow the text). Apart from the four tasks we
displayed in the case of dyadic relationships, when we shift to tryadic
relationships we should add two others brokerage endeavors, namely
international intermediation, and mediation of conflicts of interests.
a) International intermediation
Let us assume that two big multinationals wish to bind each other, through
a sort of partnership, so as to reap the benefits of huge a common market
area. However, mistrust between them could arise, fostered by domestic
groups of interest that would face losses if their arrangement were
successfully achieved.19
Against this background, the GB attempts to intermediate between both
business groups, designing the governance for the common market area
that could be responsive to most of the demands from stakeholders in
each company, shaping covenants to safeguard the new arrangement.
The United Nations, the World Bank, the IMF, a global investment bank, or
even the OECD could take charge of these negotiations, eventually.
Exhibit 4 The GB enlarges the common knowledge
by lessening asymmetric information
b)  The GB as a mediator of conflicts of interests
Now, consider the case in which two economic actors
Ok and Om
1
W W( t; Ok )
4
This area is jointly
shared with
       W W  ( t; GB )
2
3
W W( t; Ok ) Ç Ç W W( t; GB )
This area is jointly
shared with
            W W( t; Ok )
        5
W W( t; GB )20
are confronted with a serious conflict of interest
22. This can refer to power
struggles, within the same company, between two block-holders that
contend for ultimate control.
Exhibit 5 Professional tasks for the governance
broker in a  tryadic relationship
                                               
22 The reader should bear in mind that these kind of conflicts in global settings really
challenge the analyst, since the overlapping between Corporate and Public
Governance blurs not only contents but also the scope of discussion. From a more
general viewpoint, this feature was cleverly forecasted and analyzed by Hanna Arendt in









· MEDIATION IN CONFLICTS OF INTERESTS
· CLINICAL ASSISTANCE
· CONSULTANCY TO FOSTER GROWTH AND VALUE
· GOVERNANCE ENGINEERING
· TUTORING GLOBAL STANDARDS OF GOVERNANCE
GOVERNANCE
BROKER21
Another example could arise from a clash of interests between
stockholders and managers. Let us assume that the former owns an open
corporation in which there is a wide dispersal of ownership rights. The
latter, perhaps colluding and scheming with the Board of Directors, may
call into question the leadership and legitimacy of the stockholders.
Pressures from global markets and institutional investors have become so
decisive that, instead of pursuing the mediation through courts, in many
circumstances the GB may be held in regard like a more functional and
efficacious vehicle to settle the dispute.
DEALING WITH ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION
The interaction process among participants in any polyadic relationship
turns out a similar outcome to the one arising within the dyadic process,
albeit more complex than the latter. To focus on a tryadic process, shared
information can be located in four places, as we can check out by taking
a look to Exhibit 2, namely the areas 1, 2, 3, and 4. Therefore, these four
regions are likely to be benefited from the governance brokerage.
However, the success of the GB is not always a foregone conclusion, since
any participant could be reluctant not only to furnish information but also
to become a willing helper to counterparts, spoiling negotiations in the
end.
For the brokerage to be efficacious, both the customers and the GB
should be eager to shrink their areas of private information so as to stretch
out their common knowledge. The ultimate outgrowth consists in
improving accountability and transparency, as well as curbing of
opportunistic behavior.
CONCLUSIONS
In practice, Corporate Governance brings into existence a new
intermediary whose defining job consists in the brokerage of governance.
The paper brings to light the dual nature of any transaction by which the
intermediary ultimately turns out to be a broker of asymmetric information.
In defining what governance brokers are, we have provided five
illustrative settings through which they usually may perform their role.
Whenever one or more economic agents trade with a governance
broker, their underlying information sets split up. Furthermore, competition,
contest and asymmetric information must be factored into the rules of the
game.22
In the end, the governance broker stands ready to provide his customers
with a compact of professional qualifications and credentials, among
which we stressed clinical assistance, consultancy to foster growth and
value, governance engineering, tutoring global standards of governance,
international intermediation, and mediation in conflicts of interests.
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